(disclosure: i maintain the open-source project this came up in. link at the end. the question stands on its own.) we hit a trust-boundary problem while building a deterministic authorization layer for agents, and i think it generalizes. an engine can …
Everyone's focused on the sandbox escape, which is fair, it's the dramatic part. But that was a zero-day in internally hosted software. Containment bugs are old news. We know how to think about them: egress rules, microVM isolation, no ambient …
Hey everyone. I'm the author of OxDeAI, an open-source protocol (Apache 2.0). Posting it here because I want critical feedback from people building real agents, not applause. The problem I keep hitting: as agents move from generating text to doing …
I’ve been thinking about a support automation story I read recently. A team replaced a simple rules engine with an LLM classifier. The model was around 92% accurate. Sounds good. Until you realize that at 100 tickets a day, that’s roughly 8 mistakes ev…
We’ve been working on adding “authorization” to an AI agent system. At first, it felt solved: – every action gets evaluated – we get a signed ALLOW / DENY – we verify the signature before execution Looks solid, right? It wasn’t. We hit a few problems a…
Policy: – budget = 1000 – each `provision_gpu(a100)` call = 500 Result: – call 1 -> ALLOW – call 2 -> ALLOW – call 3 -> DENY (`BUDGET_EXCEEDED`) Key point: the 3rd tool call is denied before execution. The tool never runs. Also emits: – …
Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04759 This OpenClaw paper is one of the clearest signals so far that agent risk is architectural, not just model quality. A few results stood out: – poisoning Capability / Identity / Knowledge pushes attack success fro…
We ran into a simple but important issue while building agents with tool calling: the model can propose actions but nothing actually enforces whether those actions should execute. That works fine… until the agent controls real side effects: APIs infra…
Ran into this building an agent that could trigger API calls. We had validation, tool constraints, retries… everything looked “safe”. Still ended up executing the same action twice due to stale state + retry. Nothing actually prevented execution. It on…
following up on a discussion from earlier a pattern that keeps showing up in real systems: most control happens after execution – retries – state checks – monitoring – idempotency patches but the actual decision to execute is often implicit if the agen…
