Anthropic published research on GRAM: a technique to surgically remove dangerous knowledge from AI models at the weight level
Anthropic published research on GRAM: a technique to surgically remove dangerous knowledge from AI models at the weight level

Anthropic published research on GRAM: a technique to surgically remove dangerous knowledge from AI models at the weight level

Anthropic published research on GRAM: a technique to surgically remove dangerous knowledge from AI models at the weight level

Most AI safety work focuses on training models to refuse harmful requests. The problem is that the underlying knowledge is still there, meaning a determined attacker can jailbreak their way to it.

Anthropic (with AE Studio) just dropped research on a different approach called GRAM (Gradient-Routed Auxiliary Modules).

How it works:

During pretraining, GRAM adds dedicated neuron groups (modules) for each dual-use category (virology, cybersecurity, nuclear physics, etc.). When the model encounters dual-use data, only that specific module is allowed to learn from it. General weights get frozen.

After training, you can:

- Delete a module entirely (knowledge is gone)

-Keep it for trusted deployments (vetted biosecurity labs, etc.)

Key results:

-One training run produces 16 different configurations (on/off for 4 categories)

-Deletion matched the performance of never training on that data at all

-General model performance was unaffected

-Tested from 50M to 5B parameters; effectiveness increased with scale

-Resistant to recovery via fine-tuning, unlike post-hoc unlearning methods

Limitations they acknowledge: Not tested at frontier scale, not deployed in any Claude model, and some dual-use capabilities might be too entangled with general knowledge to separate cleanly.

Full paper: https://www.anthropic.com/research/off-switch-dual-use

submitted by /u/Direct-Attention8597
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